The author criticizes the current SSL/TLS system, highlighting the complexity of the ACME protocol required for certificate issuance. A significant point of contention is the frequent expiration of certificates, necessitating constant maintenance even with automation, as ACME clients require continuous access to DNS records or web servers.
Further concerns are raised regarding the security of the certificate issuance process itself. The author notes that certificates are issued over plaintext connections and points out past instances where trusted certificate authorities have used insecure keys, such as the number '4', for extended periods.
While acknowledging the need for encrypted web traffic to prevent passive eavesdropping, the author argues that the entire certificate validation system is unnecessary for this goal. As a form of protest, a 'protest certificate' was created. The only part of the certificate directly controlled by the user is the public key.
Instead of using a cryptographically random private key, the author generated a public key that visibly embeds a message: 'You don't actually have to pick random private keys. No one checks these things. A certificate authority got away with the number 4 for a year.' This demonstrates that certificate authorities do not verify the randomness or content of the public keys they sign, allowing for non-standard or even intentionally weak keys to be certified without detection.
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The author expresses frustration with the complexity and perceived flaws of the SSL/TLS certificate system, citing frequent expirations and issuance over plaintext. As a form of protest, the author created a certificate with a public key containing an embedded message, demonstrating that certificate authorities do not validate the randomness or content of public keys.