The Flume Water Monitor is a consumer device that attaches to a home's water meter to transmit near-real-time usage data. This data is sent to a companion bridge device over a 915 MHz RF signal, which then uploads the information to the cloud for access via the Flume app.
FCC documentation indicates the device uses a 50-channel frequency-hopping approach in the 902.5–927 MHz band. Analysis revealed the signal uses 2-FSK modulation at 200 kbps, with a portion of the ~25-byte messages whitened. The Cyclical Redundancy Check (CRC-16) values were validated using the generator polynomial 0x1021.
The 16-byte payload is encrypted using AES-128 Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode. The 128-bit key is derived from an 8-byte key via a hardcoded mapping. By utilizing unencrypted message header bytes and an inferred constant from existing data, the effective brute-force search space for the key was reduced from 64 bits to 44 bits, allowing for its eventual defeat.
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A researcher successfully reverse-engineered and defeated the AES-128 encryption on the Flume Water Monitor's 915 MHz RF signal, reducing the key's brute-force search space from 64 bits to 44 bits. This demonstrates a potential vulnerability in the device's communication security, though it required significant effort and prior research.